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 Do Independent Directors Curb Financial Fraud? 
The Evidence and Proposals for Further Reform† 
S. BURCU AVCI*, CINDY A. SCHIPANI** & H. NEJAT SEYHUN*** 
In this Article, we argue that the U.S. corporate governance rules put too much 
faith in the independent board members and insufficient emphasis on the sharehold-
ers to control and monitor top management. Given the agency problem between the 
board of directors and the shareholders, outside directors can be captured by man-
agement, thereby leading to inadequate checks on management. The evidence pre-
sented in this Article shows that outside board members do not exercise sufficient 
controls on management even when management has gone awry. To solve this 
agency problem, we propose increasing the power of the principals: make share-
holder resolutions binding on management, require a one share, one vote rule to 
increase the voting rights of shareholders, give the shareholders the ability to di-
rectly nominate and/or actively vote against board members, and decrease share-
holders’ barriers to exercising these rights by creating corporate platforms for ben-
eficial owners to register and vote their shares. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Around the turn of the millennium, a slew of corporate scandals involving outright 
fraud, including those at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Adelphia 
Communications, among others,1 plagued capital markets and shook investor confi-
dence to the core. Faced with this runaway corporate malfeasance by managers of 
large firms, Congress decided to discipline the managers by increasing the supervi-
sory role of the board of directors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX or “Act”)2 
was passed by Congress in an effort “[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy 
and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for 
other purposes.”3  
This was not, of course, the only option for Congress. Congress could have also 
increased the direct supervisory role of the shareholders. This alternative Congress 
decided not to pursue. We are now more than fifteen years down the road from the 
corporate scandals of the early 2000s, and we are now in a position to observe how 
well Congress’s choices have been working so far.  
The actions Congress decided to take not only included increasing the potential 
criminal and civil fines and sentences for securities fraud, but also attempted to ad-
dress corporate governance failures by adding a requirement that certain board mem-
bers be independent4 and rules regarding the composition of audit committees.5 For 
example, SOX demanded that the audit committee be comprised of entirely inde-
pendent directors6 and include at least one financial expert.7 In addition, SOX in-
cluded rules requiring outside auditors be independent.8  
                                                                                                             
 
 1. See Scott Green, A Look at the Causes, Impact and Future of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
3 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 33 (2004). 
 2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 3. Id. at pmbl. 
 4. See Green, supra note 1, at 46. 
 5. Id. at 38. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407. 
 8. Id. § 301. 
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One would have hoped these SOX-created independent watchdogs would reduce 
the incidents of securities fraud and result in better governance. Yet, our analysis of 
the number of class action settlements for claims of financial fraud for settlements 
greater than $10 million shows no significant decrease since the adoption of SOX. 
We presume that settlements of over $10 million indicate serious concern of the 
board evidencing the viability of the suit.9 The dollar amount for analysis was chosen 
to reduce the incidence of strike suits in our data. Thus, the lack of a significant 
decrease in these claims seems to indicate that it may have been unreasonable to 
expect independent directors—who almost by definition are not privy to the day-to-
day affairs of the firm—to have enough incentives or information to ferret out com-
plex, and likely hidden, fraud.  
Moreover, and perhaps even more troubling, our data also show that independent 
directors are not necessarily immune from the temptations of financial fraud, 
particularly with the gains to be had from backdating stock options. SOX’s reliance 
on them may simply have transferred oversight responsibilities from compromised 
executives to compromised and ill-informed board members. 
An alternative approach to the SOX mandates would have been to empower the 
shareholders directly and enable them to exercise a greater degree of direct oversight 
over the managers. First, it does not make logical sense for the shareholders to cede 
some of their supervisory role to the managers, the very same people that they are 
trying to supervise. This is a nonstarter. But this is exactly what happens when the 
managers vote shareholders’ proxies as they see fit. Second, the system of tracking 
the shareholders and registering all ownership of the security in the name of the 
shareholders is a long-ignored reform that puts the United States even behind most 
developing countries. It is now  nearly ten years following the Madoff scandal, and 
the United States still does not register securities directly in shareholders’ names. 
This simple reform should put an end to all future Madoff-like scandals. Finally, the 
cost to shareholders from directly exercising their supervisory role and communi-
cating with managers would be minimal in this electronic age. Companies could set 
up secure websites to allow shareholders to review corporate issues and vote their 
choices.  
We recommend that Congress take another look at this issue. Granted, although 
some shareholders are not privy to the day-to-day affairs and unless their holding is 
substantial, may rationally stay ignorant, there are also shareholders with substantial 
holdings who could be further empowered to provide an effective check on both the 
managers and the board of directors. To this extent, we thus propose that shareholder 
resolutions bind management (subject to minimum participation levels), one share to 
be required to have one vote, as well as for shareholders to have the ability to directly 
nominate and/or actively vote against board members. 
                                                                                                             
 
 9. To exclude strike suits, we require a minimum settlement amount of $10 million. The 
years 2001–2002 appear to be anomalous due to the recession and cratering stock market. We 
find that between 1996 and 2000, 42.4 lawsuits per year for an average annual total of $3.3 
billion were settled for $10 million or more, while the corresponding numbers between 2003 
and 2008 are 42.4 lawsuits per year and average annual total of $3.1 billion. While there are 
no ongoing cases from the pre-SOX period, the post-SOX numbers exclude a total of thirteen 
ongoing cases. 
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We find that the outside directors have failed with everyone else on the board to 
monitor management. In this regard, we investigated the timing and backdating of 
executive compensation options between 1996 and 2015. In this study, we find that 
outside directors manipulate their option grants like the top executives do. Similar to 
options given to the top managements, outside directors use dating and timing tech-
niques to manipulate stock options granted. Our evidence shows that they employ 
backdating, spring-loading, and bullet-dodging games to increase the value of their 
options. Backdating, among other techniques, provides remarkable profits to outside 
directors. Application of these techniques for late-reported grants increase outside 
directors’ compensation by substantial amounts. Specifically, management received 
extra compensation amounts of 9.2%, 14.9%, and 4.1% for the 1996–2002 period, 
2003–2006 period, and the 2007–2014 period, respectively. For outside directors, the 
comparable numbers are 7.0%, 10.3%, and 7.5%, respectively. For large, late-re-
ported option grants, abnormal returns increase even further. 
Our evidence strongly suggests that outside directors are not fulfilling the moni-
toring responsibility placed on them by SOX. We recommend that the solution lies 
not in strengthening the board of directors, but by strengthening the power of the 
shareholders. We make three specific recommendations. First, we recommend that 
multiclass voting structures should be eliminated. The multiclass voting structures 
exacerbate the conflict between shareholders and management and lead to inferior 
outcomes. Our second recommendation is to make shareholder resolutions binding 
on the board of directors. Currently, management typically ignores the nonbinding 
shareholder resolutions. Finally, we recommend that plurality voting be eliminated 
and replaced by majority voting for the board of directors. Majority voting shifts the 
relative power to elect the directors away from management to the shareholders.  
To address these issues, this Article is organized as follows. Part I reviews some 
of the financial frauds giving rise to SOX, followed in Part II by a discussion of the 
legislative response, focusing on the corporate governance provisions of the legisla-
tion. In Part III, we outline the role of directors and shareholders and analyze imped-
iments to the power of shareholders to oust board members. Our empirical study, 
demonstrating the ineffectiveness of SOX reforms to decrease the number of viable 
class action suits for financial frauds as well as evincing board complicity in the 
fraudulent backdating of stock options, is presented in Part IV. Next, Part V offers 
proposals for reform to empower shareholders in their oversight role. Concluding 
remarks follow. 
I. PREQUEL TO SOX: OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL FRAUDS OF THE EARLY 2000S 
On July 25, 2002, Congress passed SOX, which became law on July 30, 2002.10  
SOX was the federal government’s response to the highly publicized corporate scan-
dals that followed the tech boom of the late 1990s. The seven months before SOX’s 
enactment saw four of the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history, most famously those 
of Enron and WorldCom.11 The reports that emerged in the aftermath attributed these 
                                                                                                             
 
 10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
 11. Brooke Masters, Enron’s Fall Raised the Bar in Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), 
https://www.ft.com/content/9790ea78-1aa9-11e1-ae14-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/3S43-
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bankruptcies to the fraudulent practices of top executives, with the help of corporate 
accounting firms, lawyers, and internal audit committees.12 These companies hid 
their debts and toxic assets from creditors and shareholders, but they could not keep 
meeting financial obligations, which in turn pushed them to finally reveal massive 
losses after restating their earnings. Revelation of the frauds wreaked havoc on the 
stock market, resulting in Congress “hurriedly pass[ing] a measure that would 
toughen criminal fraud penalties to curb corporate wrongdoing.”13 
A. Enron 
Before its collapse in 2001, Enron Corporation had been viewed by many as a 
poster child for American industry and innovation.14 Once natural gas industry was 
deregulated in the 1980s, Enron, a traditional and asset-heavy gas pipeline company, 
quickly saw an opportunity in the trading business.15 By the 1990s, Enron trans-
formed into a market maker and trader in energy commodities and related deriva-
tives.16 Enron, at its peak, accounted for approximately twenty-five percent of all 
energy trading in the United States.17 The markets Enron headed provided signifi-
cantly lower transaction costs for utility companies requiring fuel sources. 
Development of technologies and the internet allowed Enron to conduct most of its 
trading online. As a result, Enron became “the biggest e-commerce company in the 
                                                                                                             
 
WVZR]; 5 Lessons from the World’s Biggest Bankruptcies, INVESTOPEDIA, https:// 
www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/lessons-worlds-biggest-bankruptcies.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/9469-JQKB]. 
 12. Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons from A Perfect Storm of 
Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 163, 167 (2003). 
 13. Richard W. Stevenson & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Fed Chief Blames Corporate Greed; 
House Revises Bill, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/17/ 
business/corporate-conduct-overview-fed-chief-blames-corporate-greed-house-revises-
bill.html [https://perma.cc/MT2V-TZ3F]. 
 14. See, e.g., Jennings, supra note 12, at 169. 
 15. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1275, 1278 (2002); Wendy Zellner, Christopher Palmeri, Peter Coy & Laura Cohn, Enron’s 
Power Play, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 11, 2002, at 70. 
 16. See Peter Coy, Emily Thornton, Stephanie Anderson Forest & Christopher Palmeri, 
Enron: Running on Empty, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2008, at 80, 80 (noting that some viewed 
Enron as the “Goldman, Sachs & Co. of the energy business”). Enron publicly acknowledged 
its change in direction via its securities filings: in 2001 Enron described its principal business 
as “security brokers, dealers and flotation,” whereas it had previously said it was in the busi-
ness of “crude petroleum & natural gas.” Enron Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Apr. 2, 
2001), http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/footprint/10K/Enron-2000-10-K.txt [https:// 
perma.cc/38QW-2BRT]; Enron Corp., Schedule 13D/A (May 7, 1999), https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/821189/0000950129-99-002013.txt [https://perma.cc/9HMJ-7L5P]. 
 17. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse; Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying 
Plunge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/13/us/enron-s-collapse-
audacious-climb-to-success-ended-in-a-dizzying-plunge.html [https://perma.cc/HAV8-SXY8]; 
Jennings, supra note 12, at 169. 
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world—and carried a bubble-era stock price to match.”18 In just fifteen years, Enron 
had reached the rank of the seventh largest American company by market capitaliza-
tion.19 
In October of 2001, because of accounting revisions, Enron disclosed “a half-
billion-dollar million after-tax charge against earnings and disclosed a $1.2 billion 
reduction of shareholders’ equity.”20 The market met this news with no immediate 
reaction: utility and energy companies were still willing to do business with Enron,21 
and investment rating agencies were reluctant to downgrade Enron’s bonds.22 But 
investors—who had paid little attention to Enron’s books during the corporation’s 
boom years—began to insist on explanations. Investors were particularly concerned 
with complex, potentially self-dealing transactions with partnerships organized 
through Enron's chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow, which had not been apparent 
in the company’s financial statements.23 Wall Street was skeptical about CEO 
Kenneth Lay’s attempts to alleviate investors’ concerns.24 The SEC, after opening an 
informal investigation into Enron in August, launched a formal inquiry.25 
Any hopes of Enron’s survival were quickly quashed as further revelations about 
Enron’s accounting and business practices came to light. The two limited partner-
ships that induced the $1.2 billion write-off were just the tip of the iceberg: according 
to Enron’s 10-K filing, the company engaged in thousands of transactions using af-
filiates and separate special-purpose entities (SPEs) to insulate the company’s earn-
ings from short-term volatility resulting from its trading activities.26 The accounting 
treatment afforded to SPEs allowed Enron to slough off its bad debts and toxic assets 
                                                                                                             
 
 18. Eichenwald, supra note 17. 
 19. See id.; see also Coy et al., supra note 16. 
 20. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT 
WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 7 (2006). 
 21. Immediately after these disclosures, an executive of a major energy trader stated that it 
was not overly concerned about Enron’s financial health. Alex Berenson & Richard A. Oppel 
Jr., Once-Mighty Enron Strains Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/28/business/28ENRO.html [https://perma.cc/3G47-6WMQ]. 
 22. See id. Some have argued that large credit rating agencies are themselves conflicted 
because they take fees from the corporations whose debt they rate. See Jerry Hirsch & Thomas 
S. Mulligan, Safeguards Failed To Detect Warnings in Enron Debacle, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 
2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/dec/14/news/mn-14906 [https://perma.cc/7T9V-
FLJY]. The head of the team at Standard & Poor’s that handled Enron also acknowledged that 
the firm faced pressure not to downgrade Enron precipitously. Id. (“We take care not to over-
react to any developing situation so that we don’t cause a deterioration [in a company’s fi-
nances] rather than just opine on it.”) (alteration in original). 
 23. See Berenson & Oppel, supra note 21.  
 24. See id. (explaining the fall in Enron’s stock after Lay provided limited disclosure after 
a large write-off in shareholders’ equity resulting from the self-dealing transactions with part-
nerships). 
 25. Alex Berenson, S.E.C. Opens Investigation into Enron, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/01/business/sec-opens-investigation-into-enron.html 
[https://perma.cc/7L69-QQTE]. 
 26. Enron Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Apr. 2, 2001) (listing Enron’s various sub-
sidiaries). For a comprehensive account of Enron’s accounting maneuvers, see Jennings, supra 
note 12, at 173–94. 
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while simultaneously inflating profits,27 provided that enough of the SPE’s equity 
was held by an unrelated party.28 In many of Enron’s transactions with its SPEs, 
either Enron, an affiliate, or an Enron executive held the equity via a series of com-
plex corporate structures and sham asset sales.29 When some of these transactions 
came under scrutiny in the fall of 2001, their prior accounting treatment was disqual-
ified and Enron was forced to consolidate these SPEs in its financial statements.30 
Enron utilized many other accounting maneuvers to misrepresent its financial 
health. For example, the company reported artificial gains and reduced losses by 
characterizing the company’s borrowings as sale-and-purchase transactions31 and 
bootstrapping its own stocks. Enron also exploited mark-to-market accounting, re-
quiring Enron to assign real-time fair market values to its derivative positions.32 
Playing this game, Enron would use excessively optimistic assumptions.33 Enron’s 
long-term energy trading contracts were also plagued by issues surrounding unclear 
valuations.34 
As revelations of these questionable accounting practices piled up, the public’s 
attention turned to the cracks in Enron’s corporate governance. Disclosures of self-
dealing practices began with the announcement that the CFO of Enron, Andrew 
Fastow, had been compensated $30 million for managing the limited partnerships 
                                                                                                             
 
 27. To summarize, the accounting treatment of SPEs would allow profits from transac-
tions between Enron and its affiliate SPE to pass through to Enron’s income statement. 
Provided that certain requirements were met, Enron could also move debt into its affiliate 
SPEs and preserve its credit rating. An investment-grade credit rating was crucial to Enron’s 
trading and derivatives operations. See Are Current Financial Accounting Standards 
Protecting Investors?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer 
Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 21–22 (2002) (statement of 
Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman, Financial Accounting Standards Board). 
 28. For an SPE to obtain off-balance-sheet treatment, it must satisfy particular rules of 
consolidation accounting. SEC accounting rules required that (a) a majority of the entity’s 
equity be controlled by an unrelated party, and (b) the unrelated party’s equity investment be 
three percent or greater. Id. at 21; William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional 
Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 
783, 868 (2013); Neal Newman, Enron and the Special Purpose Entities—Use or Abuse?—
The Real Problem—The Real Focus, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 97, 97 (2007); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2002). 
 29. See Bratton, supra note 15, at 1287–88. 
 30. In the case of its infamous Chewco SPE, for example, “Enron’s earnings for 1997 
through mid-2001 were retroactively reduced by $405 million. . . . [and the] consolidation 
increased its total indebtedness by $628 million.” Id. at 1309. 
 31. To expand on this accounting trick: “[L]oans to Enron from outside sources were 
booked as revenue, and then ‘churned’ by transfers to and from SPEs and booked again as 
profits by both Enron and the SPEs . . . .” Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate 
Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2003). 
 32. “Under [mark-to-market] accounting, even though the position remains open and gain 
or loss has not yet been realized, the firm’s income statement reflects the gain or loss implied 
by the contract’s current value.” Bratton, supra note 15, at 1303. 
 33. A statement of the accounting rules then in force is set out in FIN. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 125, at 7–10 (1996). 
 34. Bratton, supra note 15, at 1304. 
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that gave rise to the $1.2 billion write-off.35 Additionally, Fastow and many members 
of Enron’s board of directors, including members of its audit committee, benefited 
from accounting manipulations, receiving consulting fees or cash donations to their 
favored charities.36 These “perks” were often funded by the same special-purpose 
entities that were being used to hide debt.37 
The self-enriching practices of Enron’s management did not stop there. Shortly 
before Enron filed for bankruptcy, the company generously gave its former CEO, 
Kenneth Lay, at least $67.4 million.38 Enron also gave “retention bonuses” totaling 
over $100 million dollars to other members of top management to keep them at 
Enron.39 Just before Enron filed for bankruptcy, “about forty top employees received 
their entire deferred compensation in cash , . . an option that was not available to 
lower-level employees.”40 The amount paid out to senior executives between restate-
ment of earnings and filing of bankruptcy was a stunning $681 million.41 
Enron’s generosity stopped at the top management level as lower-level Enron em-
ployees’ severance payments were capped at $13,500 per employee, the equivalent 
of two weeks’ pay for some of them.42 What made these favored-employee payments 
even more egregious was that Enron encouraged its employees to invest their 401(k) 
funds in Enron stock.43 However, Enron had prohibited its employees from selling 
company shares preceding the earnings restatement, so that lower-level employees 
who had invested 401(k) funds in Enron could do nothing as their retirement funds 
declined in value.44 During this period, the media picked up on the pay disparity 
                                                                                                             
 
 35. It should be noted that the two partnerships in question, and Fastow’s role in them, 
were not completely hidden in the fall of 2001. They had been disclosed, albeit in extremely 
opaque terms, in a footnote to Enron’s 2000 financials. See ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, at 
48 (2001); see also ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 1999, at 59 (2000). 
 36. Hirsch & Mulligan, supra note 22 (“In one instance, a director was put on the payroll 
as a consultant and on several other occasions the company made large contributions to 
nonprofit groups that directors were involved with.”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Kathryn Kranhold & Mitchell Pacelle, Enron Paid Managers $681 Million Even as 
Firm Slid Toward Collapse, WALL. ST. J. (June 17, 2002, 9:28 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/SB1024266680642455000 [https://perma.cc/C83N-Z6H5]. 
 39. Kathryn Kranhold & Mitchell Pacelle, Ex-Enron Workers Pursue Bonuses Given to 
Executives Before Collapse, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2002), http://www.wsj.com/articles 
/SB1023819019250366920 [https://perma.cc/4VHK-JLSS]. 
  40. Hamilton, supra note 31, at 11; John D. McKinnon, Senate Panel Will Vote on 
Executive-Pay Plan, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2002), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB1032386849942589195 [https://perma.cc/YRX5-KL7Z].  
 41. Hamilton, supra note 31 (citing Kranhold & Pacelle, supra note 39). 
 42. See David Barboza, Enron Agrees to Increase Severance by $30 Million, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 12, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/12/business/enron-agrees-to-increase-
severance-by-30-million.html [https://perma.cc/6R69-YWNL]. 
 43. See, e.g., Daniel Altman, Experts Say Diversify, but Many Plans Rely Heavily on Company 
Stock, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/20/us/enron-s-collapse-
pensions-experts-say-diversify-but-many-plans-rely-heavily.html [https://perma.cc/XMA3-7URM]. 
 44. Richard A. Oppel. Jr., Employees’ Retirement Plan is a Victim as Enron Tumbles, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/22/business/employees-
retirement-plan-is-a-victim-as-enron-tumbles.html [https://perma.cc/54M5-WWZ5]. 
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between top management and lower-level employees.45 Lower-level employees ac-
cused executives of conducting $1.1 billion in insider stock sales during the blackout, 
dumping their shares in anticipation of negative news reaching the public.46 
On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.47 By that date, 
Enron’s share price had fallen to sixty-one cents per share, and approximately “$3.5 
billion of its bonds [were] trading at just a quarter of their face value.”48 
B. Global Crossing, Qwest, Adelphia, and WorldCom 
The Enron scandal was the first in a wave of corporate debacles that filled news 
headlines and fueled public outrage. Many of the companies embroiled in scandal 
were commonly recognizable names, such as AOL, Time Warner Inc., Rite Aid 
Corp., and Xerox Corp.49 Misleading accounting practices were particularly wide-
spread in the telecom industry: between January and June 2002, over 100 telecom 
companies restated earnings, most of which had passed public accounting muster.50 
The scandals involving Global Crossing, Qwest, Adelphia, and WorldCom exem-
plify some of the fraudulent accounting practices and self-dealing that paved the road 
to the enactment of SOX. 
1. Global Crossing 
Global Crossing was a main player in the telecom industry almost immediately 
after it came into existence but soon became bankrupt from accounting fraud: its trick 
of choice was liberal use of “pro forma accounting,” a reporting technique that pre-
sents results based on certain assumptions, allowing companies to stray significantly 
from generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).51 Using pro forma account-
ing, Global Crossing left off its financial statements many items that would be con-
sidered expenses by GAAP.52 The company dismissed concerns that certain cash 
amounts on Global Crossing’s financial statements were inflated, noting that “its au-
ditor, Arthur Andersen, had signed off on its annual reports that reflected the cash 
revenue.”53  
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The SEC eventually launched an investigation into Global Crossing.54 As Global 
Crossing later admitted, the company shredded documents even after the documents 
had been requested by the SEC as part of its investigation.55 In April 2002, Global 
Crossing filed for bankruptcy, and then in August, they made a deal with their cred-
itors to sell the business to a group of investors.56 Like the executives at Enron, 
Global Crossing’s executives profited from the inflated value of their company’s 
stock. CEO Gary Winnick received over $730 million from Global Crossing stock 
before Global Crossing filed for bankruptcy.57 To maintain the value of his stock in 
light of the impending collapse, Winnick purchased “collars,” which preserved a 
large portion of his shares’ value.58 
The Global Crossing board was filled with conflicts of interest. Several people on 
the audit committee were close to Winnick. Maria Logamasiano, who was Winnick’s 
personal banker, was on Global Crossing’s audit committee and Winnick was on her 
company’s board of advisors.59 She, along with one other member of the Global 
Crossing audit committee, eventually resigned due to conflicts.60  
2. Qwest 
On July 28, 2002, Qwest Communications International Inc. (“Qwest”) an-
nounced that it would restate earnings for 1999–2001, due to improper recognition 
of capital investments as profits.61 This disclosure came on the heels of announcing 
about a $1 billion reduction in its revenue prediction for the next year and write-
downs of $20–30 billion.62 Moreover, Qwest revealed that it was close to violating 
covenants in its loan agreements that required it to maintain certain debt-to-EBITDA 
ratios. Following this succession of bombshells, Qwest entered into settlement nego-
tiations with the SEC.63 
Qwest came into being during the telecom boom of the 1990s and made the mis-
take of excessively investing in various resources.64 To artificially inflate its financial 
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statements, Qwest teamed up with other providers of domestic telephone services to 
create gimmick transactional accounting via “swap transactions.”65 Quest announced 
that it planned to restate $950 million in revenue from mid-2000 and all of 2001 
because of swap transactions.66 In these transactions “Qwest sold capacity on [its 
own network] to another carrier and booked the revenue, while at the same time buy-
ing a nearly identical amount from the other company.”67 These deals had no purpose 
other than boosting revenues while capitalizing costs.68 These swaps became a main-
stay of the industry, but—as the top executives at telecom companies realized—they 
were not sustainable.69 Shortly before its collapse, Qwest noted that its executives 
collected close to $500 million by selling shares from 1999 to 2001.70 But two peo-
ple’s earnings stood out—one former CEO earned close to $230 million, and 
“Qwest’s largest single shareholder . . . made almost $1.5 billion by selling his shares 
in May 1999.”71  
3. Adelphia 
In late March 2002, Adelphia announced that it had failed to report $2.3 billion in 
debt.72 The price of Adelphia stock crashed and the Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) 
delisted the stock.73 Later on that year, during the month of May, Adelphia did not 
satisfy terms of multiple bank loan and bond agreements.74 Shortly after, the com-
pany filed for bankruptcy.75  
During 2001, it came out that several Rigas family members, who were on the 
company’s board, had committed various frauds and misappropriated funds.76 In 
May, all the Rigas family members resigned.77 Then in June, more truth came out: 
“the company announced that it had overstated revenues and cash flow by another 
$500 million over the previous two years”; a couple more board members announced 
their resignation.78 The next to go was the company’s auditor.79 
The collapse continued in July when the founder, John Rigas, was arrested along 
with his two sons for corporate looting and “bank, securities, and wire fraud, in effect 
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operating a multibillion-dollar scheme to defraud investors and creditors.”80 In an 
attempt to reduce company debt, the Rigas family had been purchasing additional 
stock—but with money borrowed from the company.81 They used some of this 
money to fund a golf course and African safari vacations.82 
4. WorldCom 
WorldCom, which began as a local telecom firm in 1983, had ballooned into the 
nation’s second largest long-distance telecom carrier by 2000.83 The company based 
its expansion model on acquisitions of other telecom companies, often financed with 
its own stock.84 At the same time, the company—with the help of senior employees 
and officers—employed several accounting schemes to artificially boost earnings. 
Under the direction of the CFO, the company improperly capitalized $3.8 billion in 
expenses, intending to depreciate them over time.85 This accounting caused 
WorldCom’s EBITDA to be overstated by the same amount.86 Another trick involved 
overestimating losses from uncollectable phone bills.87 These entries were corrected 
during periods of poor performance to boost profits.88 A similar trick was applied to 
properties WorldCom obtained through its acquisitions: the company would inten-
tionally “write down” the value of acquired properties to mitigate future declines in 
earnings.89 
By 2000, WorldCom was suffering from the same problems that plagued many 
other telecom companies.90 It had overinvested in fiber-optic cable, and the excess 
capacity undermined WorldCom’s earnings by lowering the cost of its services.91 
WorldCom’s first move to deal with expenses was to write down reserves on its bal-
ance sheet—which ended up saving the company over $1 billion.92 The company 
also counted as capital expenditures, instead of operating expenses, so-called “line 
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costs,” which are disbursements paid to other telecom companies to access their net-
works.93 This ploy allowed WorldCom to spread costs out over longer time periods, 
reducing WorldCom’s expenses in 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 by at least $2.6 
billion.94 
When John Sidgmore became WorldCom’s new CEO in April 2001, he ordered 
an internal audit of the company’s books.95 After investigating the company’s capital 
expenditure records, it was  discovered that several billion dollars’ worth of line costs 
were recorded as capital expenditures, rather than as expenses.96 Not only that: ap-
parently the line costs had properly been recorded as expenses initially, but had been 
transferred to asset accounts during the account closing process.97 Internal auditors 
reported all this information to the chair of the audit committee—not long after, this 
committee chair, the CFO, and the controller were all fired.98 
Like Enron, WorldCom had employed Big Five accounting firm Arthur Andersen 
as its external auditor. In February 2002, Andersen reported to the company’s board 
audit committee that there had been no significant transactions or changes in account-
ing policies in the past year, and that the company had strict internal controls in place 
to detect false financial reporting.99 These statements were untrue. In June of 2002, 
WorldCom admitted to overstating its earnings in earlier years by close to $4 billion 
by “treating expense items as capital investments”—which was the largest restate-
ment of earnings an American corporation had ever admitted.100 The company’s 
credit rating nosedived, and an additional $3 billion in improperly recorded expenses 
was discovered, adding more to the already record high restatement of earnings.101  
The consequences of WorldCom’s fall were massive. WorldCom reduced their 
workforce by a staggering ten percent from 2001 to 2002—which equaled more than 
20,000 employees.102 A large number of the employees who were laid off were blue-
collar workers who had built WorldCom’s massive fiber-optic network.103 From 
1999 to 2002, WorldCom’s stock price fell from $60 to less than $1.104 While lower-
level employees were being let go in huge numbers, over $280 million was given to 
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top executives from a two-year bonus retention program.105 Eventually, approxi-
mately $1.4 million originally promised to executives went to fund severance pack-
ages for lower-level employees, but the amount covered fewer than half of the em-
ployees who had been let go.106 
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 
A. Legislative History of SOX 
Attempts at legislative reform were met with resistance by the Bush administra-
tion and conservative members of Congress.107 Although mounting evidence of 
widespread corporate fraud fueled discussions between Congress and the administra-
tion on potential reform measures, progress stalled due to disagreements over the 
measures’ policy objectives.108 President Bush’s early reform proposal was a “ten-
point plan” that focused on oversight.109 The President’s initial proposals were criti-
cized as failing to “draw real blood” that would hold corporate executives accounta-
ble.110 
In June 2002, the political dynamic finally shifted because of the WorldCom scan-
dal.111 By that point, the outcry had reached a fever pitch. Regulation of financial 
reporting and corporate governance were issues of peak salience and importance to 
the general American public. Consider, for example, as noted by Prentice and 
Spence, a June 2002 article in USA Today entitled How Did Business Get So Darn 
Dirty?, which argued that greed was one of the main answers.112 Prentice and Spence 
also pointed to a Gallup poll in 2002 showing that the percentage of people consid-
ering “‘big business’ to be a major threat to America’s future” had increased by four-
teen points from the two years prior.113 Democrats jumped to make these scandals an 
issue in their election campaigns the following November.114 In making his case for 
the necessity of comprehensive reform, Senator Leahy did not mince words: 
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Enron has become a symbol for the torrent of corporate fraud scandals 
that have hit the front pages and battered our financial markets. Tyco, 
Xerox, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossings, the list goes on.  
 The things that happened at Enron did not happen by mistake. They 
were not the result of one or two “bad apples.” Senior management at 
Enron, assisted by an army of accountants and lawyers spun an intricate 
web of deceit. They engaged in a systematic fraud that allowed them to 
secretly take hundreds of millions of dollars out of the company. This 
kind of fraud is not the work of a lone fraud artist. Rather, it is sympto-
matic of a corporate culture where greed has been inflated and honesty 
devalued.  
 Unfortunately, as I have said and as the experts warned at our 
February 6 hearing, Enron does not appear to have been alone. Each 
week we read of corporation after corporation that has engaged in mis-
conduct, and these are not small or marginal corporations. These are ma-
jor mainstays of corporate America. The web of deceit woven by such 
publicly traded companies ensnares and victimizes the entire investing 
public who depend on the transparency and integrity of our markets for 
everything from their retirement nest eggs to their children’s college 
funds.115 
The House of Representatives introduced H.R. 3763, the Corporate and Auditing 
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002,116 on February 14, 
2002. The bill was sponsored by Republican House Representative Michael G. 
Oxley, Chair of the House Financial Services Committee.117 Like the reform pro-
posals proposed by President Bush, the primary focus of H.R. 3763 was transparency 
in, and oversight of, corporate accounting practices.118 Unlike the final rule, it con-
tained no provision for increased criminal penalties—unsurprising, given that the 
House Financial Services Committee typically lacks jurisdiction over criminal is-
sues.119 Even though H.R. 3763 contained provisions similar to those shaping the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the Sarbanes proposal, 
the Oxley-sponsored bill was decidedly more friendly to corporate interests. The bill 
largely let the SEC decide how to regulate auditors.120 It contained fewer curbs on 
consulting by auditors and would have permitted private groups to form one or more  
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oversight boards for the accounting industry.121 House Democrats offered their own 
bill,122 as well as a set of proposed amendments to Oxley’s bill, both of which the 
House majority rejected.123 The House passed H.R. 3763 by a vote of 334 to 90 on 
April 24, 2002.124 The next day, it was referred to the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs in the Senate.125 The Senate version, S. 2673, brought 
up in the Senate in June, dealt mostly with “accounting reform and not criminal sanc-
tions.”126 Neither committee, however, normally had jurisdiction over criminal mat-
ters.127 
Sarbanes’s bill “passed out of the Senate Banking Committee on a vote of 17 to 
4” and reached the Senate floor in July,128 where it was subject to numerous amend-
ments. In general, the Republicans in Congress favored the relaxed oversight and 
governance standards in the Oxley bill, while the Democrats sought to strongly reg-
ulate markets.129 Both Democrats and Republicans eagerly embraced stronger crim-
inal sanctions, however.130 
In the end, the Senate decided to incorporate their bill with the Oxley Act.131 On 
July 15, Representative F. James Sensenbrenner introduced the Corporate Fraud 
Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 5118, allowing even tougher criminal sanctions for 
accounting and auditing wrongdoings at public companies; the bill passed by a vote 
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of 391 to 28 in the House the next day.132 In conference, the bill’s more severe pen-
alties were incorporated into the Act.133 Congress also grafted the criminal provisions 
from the Leahy bill (S. 2010) onto the accounting reforms and implemented the mod-
ified White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act.134 All the text from the Senate’s 
bill was included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was then signed into law by the 
President on July 29.135 
B. SOX 
In this Part, we focus on the corporate governance reforms required by SOX. 
These include the requirement that a majority of the members of the board of 
directors be outside directors as well as the mandate requiring an audit committee 
and the independence of all its members. Additionally, the board must disclose 
whether the audit committee membership includes at least one financial expert—as 
further defined in the accompanying SEC regulations—and if not, why. It also 
requires independence of the outside auditor. These provisions are discussed next. 
1. Audit Committees 
The audit committee requirements of the Act were meant to enhance the ability 
of the board of directors to monitor management and outside auditors.136 Most of 
these requirements, however, did not represent a significant departure from SEC and 
stock exchange requirements then in place. Despite its limited power to regulate the 
conduct of directors and officers,137 the SEC has shaped the corporate governance 
standards embodied in the SOX Act in two main ways: by imposing disclosure re-
quirements directly on companies, and by encouraging national stock exchanges to 
develop listing standards. 
As early as the 1970s,138 the SEC supported establishment of audit committees 
“to make management more accountable to the board and to emphasize the function 
of the board in monitoring the activities of the management.”139 The SEC required 
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disclosure in the company’s proxy materials regarding whether the company had an 
audit, nomination, or compensation committee, together with the membership, 
number of yearly meetings, and functions of such committee, if they existed.140 
Around this same time, national stock exchanges followed the SEC and began 
requiring certain corporate governance standards as a condition to being listed. For 
example, according to the Nasdaq and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules, 
the two largest stock exchanges in the world by market capitalization,141 a listed com-
pany must have an audit committee consisting of independent directors.142 Early ver-
sions of Nasdaq and NYSE listing standards imposed fewer requirements on the audit 
committee.143 For example, the Nasdaq originally only required that a majority of the 
audit committee be independent.144 
The major accounting fiascoes in 1998,145 particularly the widespread practice of 
“earnings management,”146 led the SEC to reevaluate the role of audit committees.147 
Then-Chairman Levitt, emphasizing “the crucial role of boards of directors as repre-
sentatives of the shareholders” and noting the audit committee’s responsibility “to 
ensure that shareholders receive relevant and reliable financial information,” pro-
posed that the audit committee play a more active oversight role by meeting more 
frequently and asking tough questions.148 The audit committee could then become 
more critical of the CEO and CFO.149 
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As part of a larger plan to improve financial reporting quality, Chairman Levitt 
tasked the NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) with 
forming a “blue ribbon” panel to “improve audit committee performance.”150 In re-
sponse to recommendations issued by the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) in 1999,151 
the NYSE and Nasdaq imposed substantial changes to their corporate governance 
and listing standards (“the BRC revisions”).152 The changes included requiring that: 
the audit committee consist of at least three “independent directors”;153 all audit com-
mittee members be “financially literate”;154 at least one member have financial or 
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accounting experience;155 each audit committee have a written charter;156 and each 
audit committee receive a description of the number of relationships between the 
company and a director or her family member that would foreclose a finding of in-
dependence.157 
To complement the BRC revisions, the SEC heightened its disclosure require-
ments with respect to audit committees. Each proxy statement must disclose whether 
the company has an audit committee.158 Audit committees are required to vouch for 
the accuracy of financial statements,159 disclose whether they signed off on the fi-
nancial statements, state whether an audit committee’s written charter spells out the 
committee’s duties, and submit any charter to the SEC every three years.160 
Under section 301,161 SOX mandates that all public companies appoint an audit 
committee of the board of directors.162 Each audit committee is to be “directly re-
sponsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight” of the external auditor, 
and the auditors are to report directly to the audit committee.163 According to this 
section, an audit committee must put an internal system into place that deals with 
various complaints, including complaints about accounting and other related matters 
within the corporation.164 To encourage financial reporting quality and independent 
external auditing, section 301(3) imposes an independence requirement on each  
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member of the audit committee.165 To be independent, an audit committee member 
should not be “an affiliated person” with respect to the company and should not “ac-
cept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee” from the firm.166  
Section 301 grew out of a sense that public company boards had failed their over-
sight responsibilities and become beholden to the whims of the top executives—as 
SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson pointed out, “Many boards have become 
gradually more deferential to the opinions, judgments and decisions of the CEO and 
senior management team. . . . [which] has been an obstacle to directors’ ability to 
satisfy . . . [their] responsibility.”167 This was a massive change because general cor-
porate law had typically been a state, not federal issue.168 
The SEC, on April 25, 2003, did a couple things. First, the SEC required, in 
compliance with section 301, each national securities exchange and national securi-
ties exchange association give it a list of amendments or proposed changes.169 
Second, “the SEC required only that audit committee members be independent,” in-
stead of the entire board.170 Additionally, the SEC was supposed to, per SOX section 
407, put out rules that required companies to disclose if (and if not, why) the audit 
committee has at least one financial expert as a member, as the term is defined by 
the SEC.171 In defining “financial expert,” the Act considers a member’s qualifica-
tions through her “education and experience as a public accountant or auditor or a 
principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting officer.”172 An “un-
derstanding of GAAP, and experience in preparing or auditing of financial state-
ments” can also be considered “financial expertise” according to the Act.173 
The SEC implemented this mandated course of action later in March 2003. The 
SEC released rules requiring all public companies to disclose whether they had a 
financial expert on their audit committees and explain the reason why if they did 
not.174 The SEC attempted to make sure that these financial experts did not have 
greater liability than other board members by stating that the financial experts would 
not have “greater duties or obligations under the securities laws,” and limited the 
term “expert” so certain provisions in securities laws would not apply.175 Whether 
someone is a financial expert is determined by the board of directors.176 
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2. Auditor-Client Relationships 
Under section 201 of SOX, which adds section 10A(g) to the Exchange Act of 
1934,177 external auditors are prohibited from providing certain kinds of non-audit 
services to their audit clients. For example, they may not provide “financial infor-
mation systems design and implementation” services, bookkeeping services, “ap-
praisal or valuation services,” “actuarial services,” “internal audit outsourcing ser-
vices,” “management functions or human resources” services, “investment banking 
services,” “legal services,” and other services that might be determined by regulation 
to be impermissible.178 Furthermore, public companies are required to disclose the 
dollar value of audit and audit-related services versus permitted non-audit services.179 
Additionally, SOX section 203 includes both term limits and restrictions on the 
external auditor.180 Although the original idea of having a mandatory periodic rota-
tion of audit firms was dropped, section 203 as enacted requires that audit engage-
ment partners and audit reviewing partners—that is, the highest-ranking employees 
of a public accounting firm—be rotated off the engagement after five years.181 
Furthermore, public accounting employees may not switch over and become 
employees of a client they have audited until a certain “cooling off” period has run.182 
 Section 202 requires, with an exception for some de minimis services, that all 
services provided from an auditor and to an issuer have pre-approval from the audit 
committee.183 These pre-approvals must be disclosed, pursuant to the Exchange Act, 
in a company’s periodic reports.184 
C. Other Relevant Provisions 
There are several other relevant provisions in SOX aimed at improving the gov-
ernance of corporations. They are described briefly below. 
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1. Loans to Officers 
Section 402 generally prohibits public companies from “directly or indirectly 
mak[ing] loans to their officers” and directors.185 This section also interfered with 
normal practices at many public companies, such as “travel advances, personal use 
of a company car,” and others.186 
2. Code of Ethics Disclosure 
Section 406 mandates that public companies take action in several ways related 
to code of ethics disclosures, including publicly disclosing whether the company has 
any adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers, has made any changes to 
it, and if the company granted any waivers from the code.187 Later, the SEC issued 
rules requiring public companies to disclose whether a code of ethics has been 
adopted and to file the code with the SEC.188 A code of ethics must require: 
(1) Honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual 
or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional rela-
tionships; 
(2) Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in reports 
and documents that a registrant files with, or submits to, the Commission 
and in other public communications made by the registrant; 
(3) Compliance with applicable governmental laws, rules and regula-
tions; 
(4) The prompt internal reporting of violations of the code to an appro-
priate person or persons identified in the code; and 
(5) Accountability for adherence to the code.189 
The SEC promulgated rules to implement sections 406 and 407 in March of 2003—
the section 407 SEC rules expanded section 406 to cover disclosure of any code of 
ethics that applies to a company’s CEO.190 
3. Forfeiture of Certain Bonuses and Profits 
 Under section 304, “if a public company is required to prepare an accounting 
restatement due to material non-compliance with any financial reporting requirement 
under the securities laws, as a result of misconduct,” then the company’s top 
executive officer and financial officer: 
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[M]ust reimburse the corporation for (i) any bonus or other incen-
tive-based or equity-based compensation received by such person 
during the twelve-month period following the first public issuance 
of the defective report and (ii) any profits realized from the sale of 
securities of the corporation during that twelve-month period. . . . 
[This Section was intended to] forc[e] the principal officers of the 
company to pay more attention to the company’s financial report-
ing and to dissuade management from focusing on short-term 
gain.191 
III. THE ROLES OF THE BOARD AND THE SHAREHOLDERS 
A. The Board of Directors 
Boards of directors have always been a traditional element of American corporate 
governance. In the early days, boards were responsible for managing the day-to-day 
business of corporations.192 “This was because they were made up primarily of con-
trolling shareholders and managers selected by those shareholders.”193 Lately, in the 
era of highly dispersed ownership of corporations, directors usually perform their 
duties on a part-time basis.194 Recognizing this trend, modern corporate laws call for 
management of the corporation to fulfill the boards’ duties.195 “Traditionally, it is 
said that the board sets corporate policy, makes the major decisions, and delegates to 
management the task of carrying out policy and those decisions.”196 As an independ-
ent governing body, the board is supposed to be separate from senior management.197 
An independent board, in theory, does not have substantial ties to top management 
and thus will be comfortable objecting with them, as needed.198 The reality draws 
quite a different picture.  
The absence of a controlling shareholder increased the role of the CEO, reducing 
the board to an “advisory rather than supervisory”199 role. The Gordon and Mace 
studies even found that contemporary management, setting a corporation’s policies 
and making certain major decisions, limited the boards’ role to providing “formal 
approval (almost never disapproval) of those policies and decisions.”200 Boards, be-
ing inferior to management, slipped into a rubberstamping role. Supervision is also 
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undermined by another factor: management often participates in the handpicking of 
directors before elections; directors now often “owe their positions to the officers 
they are supposed to supervise, and they rely upon those same officers for the 
information they use in supervising them.”201  
Monitoring is another function of boards in corporate governance. The board is 
responsible for discovering bad faith or incompetence,202 and for the “hiring and fir-
ing of senior management, particularly the chief executive officer.”203 In practice, 
however, boards face a challenging task of detecting managerial malfeasance di-
rectly, typically acting on a part-time, irregular basis. As Professor Adams and col-
leagues note, a board would rely “on the actions of outside auditors, regulators, and, 
in some instances, the news media,”204 or on the information provided by a CEO.205 
The explanation is simple: directors do not have time to pay close attention to mon-
itoring tasks. Monitoring of management is often collegial, where directors learn 
from management “why the officers recommend a particular course of action and 
officers are not perceived as inferior to directors when the board makes most of its 
business decisions.”206 
In addition, directors serve in a counseling or advisory role. A board may provide 
input on matters “about which one or more board members are expert[s].”207 Boards 
may also give advice or opinions to top management about general business mat-
ters.208 Occasionally, a corporate board may also act as a mediator between share-
holders and managers, or other constituencies such as creditors.209  
Performing a managerial function, the board ultimately decides major corporate 
issues, such as bringing certain lawsuits on the company’s behalf, selling the corpo-
ration, buying or merging with other companies, dividend distributions to sharehold-
ers, and the corporation’s capital structure.210  
As evidence of the board’s influence over corporate governance practices, a study 
of 1500 S&P firms from 1998 to 2004 linked weak corporate governance and back-
dating.211 The study found higher levels of backdating when the following factors 
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were present: more inside and gray directors on the board, independent directors ap-
pointed by the incumbent CEO, director compensation in options, and CEOs serving 
as the chair of the board.212 Another study found correlations between measures of 
CEO influence, such as lower numbers of independent directors, longer CEO 
tenure, and opportunistically timed stock grants.213 
B. Shareholders 
In contrast, the shareholders’ role in corporate governance has traditionally been 
limited.214 Corporate law relies on the principle of separation of ownership and 
control215: shareholders own the corporation and the board manage the busi-
ness. Shareholders who oppose the business decisions of the board or management 
cannot affect change directly: they can only exit,216 sue,217 or vote.218 Thus, share-
holder rights can be divided into four groups: economical, litigation, control, and 
informational. Shareholders vote at annual meetings which, at least in theory, 
should provide “a channel for communication between shareholders, the board, 
and management.”219 On time-sensitive matters, shareholders may convene a 
special shareholder meeting to vote on the issue.220 
1. Shareholder Voting: An Overview 
A fundamental right of the shareholder is the election of directors.221 Delaware 
Chancellor William Allen has described shareholder voting as “the ideological  
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underpinning” that “legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors and 
officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do not own.”222 A fully 
informed shareholder vote ratifies board action, even if it is in favor of a “voidable” 
transaction.223  
Yet, shareholder voting power has frequently proved to be an ineffective way to 
control management in highly dispersed corporations. Individual shareholders who 
own a small percentage of stock are unlikely interested in investing their time and 
energy in costly monitoring activities. Empirical evidence shows that successful 
challenges of management by a rival team seeking to run the company better are 
quite rare.224 In addition to costs, shareholders are likely uncertain about a rival 
team’s future capabilities. Shareholders often stay conservative, giving preference to 
current management, even when feeling dissatisfied. The case is different in corpo-
rations with a high amount of institutional ownership. “Institutions are more likely 
than other shareholders to vote at all, more likely to vote against manager proposals, 
and more likely to vote for proposals by other shareholders.”225 Skeptics, on the other 
hand, view activist institutional investors as extracting short-term profit at the ex-
pense of long-term growth.226 
2. Shareholder Voting Rights 
Under the Delaware General Corporations Law (DGCL), each stockholder is en-
titled to vote at a meeting of stockholders or by proxy.227 In addition, each stock-
holder has one vote for each share, unless the corporate charter provides otherwise.228 
There are several circumstances that require a shareholder vote. Under Delaware law, 
shareholders elect the board of directors.229 Charter230 and bylaws231 amendments 
also require shareholder approval. Professor Bebchuk refers to such amendments as 
“rules-of-the-game” decisions.232 Certain major corporate decisions also require a 
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shareholder vote, such as mergers233 or a sale of all or substantially all the assets,234 
commonly referred to as “game-ending” decisions.235 Under NYSE rules, share-
holder approval is required for equity compensation plans; in certain self-dealing 
transactions; or if the issuance of stock increases the number of outstanding shares 
or voting power by twenty percent or more.236  
The Dodd-Frank Act provides shareholders of public companies with an advi-
sory vote on compensation paid to executives (“Say on Pay”)237 as well as golden 
parachute payments in the case of a merger or acquisition.238 The Act produced 
immediate favorable results. During the 2011 proxy season, for example, 
management in some public companies “either changed the company’s pay 
practices in response to the possibility of an unfavorable shareholder vote, or 
offered additional disclosure explaining pay practices that had come onto the 
shareholder radar screens.”239 
It is well-settled, however, that the board of directors initiates all ma-
jor corporate decisions; “[s]hareholders may not initiate any such decisions.”240 
Thus shareholders have only a veto power.241 A veto power on important business 
matters presumably gives shareholders some form of control over the corporation, 
or at least preserves an important mechanism. Yet, as Professors Thompson and 
Edelman note, “[v]oting plays a limited role in corporate decisionmaking, much 
more limited than in the public sphere.”242 
3. Director Elections 
Under Delaware law, shareholders elect the board of directors,243 with the board 
acting as “a surrogate for and in the interests of the shareholders.”244 As Professor 
Velasco noted, “[i]n theory, this should give shareholders ultimate control over the 
business. In practice, however, it does not.”245 Some scholars have commonly rec-
ognized that “the reality is that management, and not shareholders, generally se-
lects the directors.”246 Because of the highly-dispersed nature of corporate owner-
ship, “the CEO [is] able to run the daily operations of the firm and [can] handpick 
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nominees to the board,”247 placing boards effectively in an inferior position to the 
CEO.248 In addition, shareholders often prefer to sell their shares if they disagree with 
management, rather than voting or contesting elections249—a less costly choice. 
“Typically there is only one slate of nominees, presented by the board itself, and 
directors can be elected by a simple plurality.”250 It should be noted that many cor-
porations have recently changed the procedure, requiring the vote of a majority of 
the shares cast.251 Under the former system, if only one shareholder voted, the nom-
inees would still be elected.252 Any shareholder may nominate a candidate for elec-
tions, but first, such proposal must be submitted to the board. If the board rejects the 
proposal, the shareholder may choose to engage in a “proxy contest” to include the 
candidate in elections,253 or give up the idea. This is an expensive and time-consum-
ing endeavor, which would require the shareholder “to file Schedule 14A with the 
SEC, hire a proxy solicitor, and often engage in an expensive public campaign to 
support their nominee or nominees,”254 with reimbursement by the corporation only 
if the nominee is elected.  
4. Factors Undermining Democratic Shareholder Voting 
Even if shareholders are dissatisfied with the current board and choose to chal-
lenge the incumbents, the rate of their success is highly discouraging. The entrench-
ment of incumbent boards is reflected in the empirical data: a 2011 survey of Russell 
3000 companies reported that of 16,822 candidates nominated for board seats, only 
26 candidates were proposed by shareholders; “the success rate for these incumbent 
candidates was 99.9%, compared to 46% for the candidates proposed by sharehold-
ers.”255 Professors Becker and Subramanian calculated that “[o]nly 69 director seats, 
or 0.4% of total director elections, presented a choice for shareholders of U.S. com-
panies in 2011.”256 
a. Financial Costs to Challenging an Incumbent Board 
It is very typical for a publicly traded corporation to have only one candidate for 
each board position; this candidate is almost always nominated by management. 
Only current management can utilize corporate funds to solicit proxy votes for its 
                                                                                                             
 
 247. Alces, supra note 192, at 788. 
 248. Id. at 788–89. 
 249. Thompson & Edelman, supra note 242, at 130. 
 250. Id. at 138. 
 251. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1227, 1232 (2008). 
 252. Thompson & Edelman, supra note 242, at 138. 
 253. Bo Becker & Guhan Subramanian, Improving Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2013). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 2. 
 256. Id. 
786 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:757 
 
slate of director candidates.257 The challenging party must finance its own proxy ma-
terials.258  
Unsurprisingly, bearing the full cost of challenging management candidates rep-
resents a significant impediment to shareholder power. If a shareholder wants to 
place candidates on the corporate ballot, the shareholder “must absorb the print-
ing costs, postage costs, and legal costs of mounting a full-blown proxy solicitation, 
and these costs can amount to millions of dollars.”259 This asymmetry “ultimately 
leads to lessened accountability by the incumbent board and management to share-
holders.”260 As Professor Bebchuk notes, “[w]hile potential challengers have insuf-
ficient incentive to invest in mounting a proxy contest, incumbents have excessive 
incentive to invest in opposing a challenge: they have an incentive to spend more 
than is optimal from the shareholders’ collective perspective.”261 
In addition, there is an issue of sharing the benefits of winning a contest. If the 
challenging party wins the election, the shareholder waging the proxy contest will be 
reimbursed for proxy solicitation expenses. And yet, on the benefit side, the share-
holder will receive only its pro rata interest of the increased price of his or her 
shares.262
 
Thus, there is an obvious discouraging factor to engaging in a proxy con-
test: the benefit will be shared among all shareholders, “while the risk of loss (the 
costs) is borne” solely by the challenging party.263 
Charles Elson presents an interesting solution to this problem: to provide reim-
bursement of reasonable expenses to challengers who lose by only a small percent-
age.264 Presumably, a challenger with low chances to win will not engage in the con-
test. By participating, they would expose themselves to a great risk of losing by a 
substantial vote margin, depriving the challenger of the right for reimbursement.  
b. Shareholder Uncertainty and Costs 
Convincing shareholders that a rival team will perform better is not an easy task. 
Incumbent candidates would have a better track record of performance at a particular 
company, thus making their plans less hypothetical. A rival team would have a dif-
ficult time presenting “as complete a picture of their plans as the incumbents can,”265 
with incumbents relying on their experience from past years. Additionally, rival 
teams may not be able to specify their CEO pick well in advance, as such candidates 
may not be willing to engage in conversations with rival team members, whereas 
shareholders generally know the name of the CEO nominated by the incumbents at 
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the time of elections.266 Thus, the incumbents are more predictable in the future, 
making them less risky for individual shareholders.  
Another challenge a rival team may face is shareholder passiveness and lack of 
interest in election: many shareholders fail to vote.267 This failure to vote accords 
with rational choice theory: when one vote is unlikely to change the election’s out-
come, the individual’s “tangible benefit of the outcome of an election is modest” at 
best, if there is one at all.268 The collective action/free-riding problem comes into 
play here as well. Although institutional investors have no collective action issue, 
they may still be reluctant to support a rival team. Banks, for example, are looking 
for new business from companies, and thus, voting for a challenger may prevent them 
from obtaining business from the incumbents.269 
In the current U.S. system, shares are commonly held in “street name,” where the 
broker with whom the stocks were purchased, or another intermediary entity, is listed 
as the legal owner on a corporation’s records but the shareholder still receives the 
financial benefits as the “beneficial owner” of the stock.270 If a shareholder desires, 
she can register her shares with the Direct Registration System, which allows a share-
holder to move her shares from street name to directly registered in her name and 
back to street name.271 Unfortunately, this system, created in 1996, can take up to 
thirty days to prepare a shareholder’s directly held stock for sale, although two to 
five days is more common.272 
c. Administrative Issues 
Generally, the basic rules of shareholder voting follow about the same structure, 
and most shareholders vote by proxy.273 The election administration is not flawless, 
however. Weaknesses and inconsistencies include inaccurate shareholder lists,274 de-
lays and omissions in ballot distribution,275 and incomplete vote tabulation by the 
subcontractor firms that run elections on behalf of public companies.276 
Inaccuracies may lead to doubt among shareholders as to whether the election 
results are legitimate. It is especially troubling in cases of contested elections—ar-
chaic administration may create additional impediments, and a rival team may incur 
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significant expenses if it loses the election. Furthermore, “even if an election’s out-
come is not in doubt, managers and shareholders pay attention to not only the identity 
of the victor, but also to the vote totals on both sides.”277 In addition, “[i]f votes are 
not counted accurately, then voting totals become noisier signals of shareholders’ 
preferences, undermining the value of corporate elections as a form of communica-
tion.”278 
5. Recent Changes Facilitating Shareholder Voice 
a. The Decline of Staggered Boards 
One of the attributes of corporate governance, commonly criticized by the propo-
nents of shareholder power, is staggered boards. The staggered board has primarily 
served as an antitakeover mechanism. Typically, in a staggered board, directors are 
divided into three separate classes serving staggered terms,279 and shareholders elect 
only a third of the directors (one class) in any given year.280 It therefore takes a rival 
two years to replace a majority of the board and gain control. The alternative is a 
unitary board. In a unitary board structure, shareholders vote on all director positions 
at each annual meeting.281  
Professor Bebchuk found two ways in which staggered boards obstruct challenges 
against incumbent directors. First, it increases costs, because “[r]ivals need to run a 
slate of directors [at least] twice,” “campaign[ing] for more than a year.” 282 Second, 
shareholders are reluctant to vote for a rival, even with a better agenda, in a company 
with staggered board structure.283 After a rival wins the first round of elections, the 
board will be internally divided for at least one year.284 This instable transition dis-
courages shareholders. 
Staggered boards may also lead to “lower value, a greater likelihood of making 
acquisitions that are value-destroying, and a greater propensity to compensate exec-
utives without regard to whether they actually do a good job.”285 These factors and 
pressure from the public led to a decline of staggered board in American corporate 
practice: “302 S&P 500 companies had staggered boards in 2002”;286 in 2016, only 
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84 boards held staggered elections.287 “Of 900 other companies outside the S.&P. 
500, staggered board adoption rates have declined by about 25 percent since 
2002.”288 Many institutional investors and proxy advisers favor de-staggering boards 
as well.289 
b. Majority Voting 
Large companies have been recently adopting majority voting.290 Under this sys-
tem, uncontested board nominees must receive more of the “for” votes than “against” 
or “withheld” votes to win elections.291 Plurality voting represents an alternative 
way—the nominees receiving the most “for” votes are elected or re-elected.292 Thus, 
“a director would simply need to receive a plurality of the votes cast.”293 The main 
concern with the plurality voting rule arises in an uncontested election; there, a di-
rector may win the election upon receiving just one “for” vote294 (assuming all other 
votes were “withheld”).295 It follows that if only one candidate is on the ballot, she 
wins.  
The majority vote rule challenges incumbent directors, making them more ac-
countable, “because every election, in effect, becomes a contest between the candi-
date and ‘not the candidate.’”296 It also makes the challenging process cheaper—
unsatisfied shareholders do not need to run their own candidates because sharehold-
ers may campaign for withholding votes. The opponents of the majority voting rule, 
on the other hand, are concerned that “shareholders could withhold (or threaten to 
withhold) votes for reasons unrelated to shareholder value maximization.”297 This is 
especially relevant for companies with institutional shareholders. 
The majority voting movement began in the 2006 proxy season, when some “in-
stitutional shareholders
 
submitted more than 140 shareholder proposals calling for 
the adoption of [this voting rule].”298 It received substantial support—in 2007, for 
example, the rate of success of these proposals was more than 50%.299 Professor Choi 
and colleagues found that in 2005, “only nine of the S&P 100 companies used ma-
jority voting in director elections”; “as of January 2014, almost 90 percent of S&P 
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500 companies have adopted some form of majority voting.”300 Studies have shown 
that the adoption of majority voting led to “positive abnormal returns,” but that this 
effect diminished over time.301 Another study found that firms that adopted majority 
voting were more likely to implement shareholder proposals that, in turn, positively 
impacted stock price.302  
 Adoption of the majority voting rule may be explained by several factors. One 
possibility is self-selection—companies with “good” and proactive corporate gov-
ernance self-select into adopting majority voting.303 Another is that majority voting 
makes directors more responsive to shareholder interests.304 A third possibility is that 
companies that have adopted majority voting may engage in more campaigning 
(“electioneering”) in close elections because the implications of receiving a majority 
withhold votes are more severe.305 They may do so by lobbying Institutional 
Shareholder Services not to issue a “withhold” or “against” recommendation or by 
targeting shareholders directly.306 “Finally, shareholders may be more reluctant to 
cast a vote against a nominee when a failure to get a majority of ‘for’ votes could 
result in the ouster of the nominee.”307 Shareholders may perceive that a failed elec-
tion at a company with a majority voting rule may interfere with the board function-
ing or impact stock price and therefore be reluctant to cast a “no” vote. 
c. SEC Proxy Rules 
For many years, the restrictive SEC proxy rules imposed significant costs on po-
tential insurgents and chilled shareholder speech.308 Since 1992, however, the SEC 
has been gradually relaxing its proxy requirements. In 2007, the SEC promulgated 
its “eProxy” rules, which were designed to further reduce costs by eliminating the 
mailing costs of proxy statements to shareholders.309  
Under the new Rule 14a-16, public companies mail shareholders only a Notice of 
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, at least forty days prior to the shareholder 
meeting.310 All proxy materials now “must be publicly accessible, free of charge, at 
the Web site address specified in the notice,” and must remain there through the con-
clusion of the shareholder meeting.311 A shareholder may solicit proxies pursuant to 
the new rule as well.312 Online posting of proxy materials reduces at least distribution  
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costs, as only a single page—the notice—needs to be mailed (the cost of printing and 
mailing was estimated $5–$6 per set of proxy materials).313 The SEC 
Commissioner noted that these savings “help level the playing field between man-
agement and dissenting shareholders.”314 The practice shows, however, that eProxy 
has not often been employed.315  
d. Changes in Broker Rules 
The majority of shares are held in “street name” by custodians, such as banks 
and brokerage firms, on behalf of their clients, the “beneficial owners” of the 
shares.316 Issuers of proxy materials do not know the identity of the beneficial 
owner, which in turn impedes communication with shareholders.317 Brokers are 
required to forward proxy materials to the beneficial owners for a fee, paid by the 
issuer.318 In some circumstances, typically in cases of routine and “uncontested” 
matters, brokers were permitted to vote shares on behalf of beneficial owners.319 
There is no practical reason for brokers not to support management on these 
matters because they do not have an economic interest in the corporation.  
In 2010, the NYSE rules and the Dodd-Frank Act prohibited brokers from vot-
ing shares on behalf of the owners in nonroutine matters, without shareholder in-
structions in most circumstances.320 Under amended Rule 452 of the NYSE, direc-
tor elections, regardless of whether they are contested, are considered nonroutine 
and brokers may not vote the shares without instructions.321 Similarly, section 957 
of the Dodd-Frank Act bars brokers from voting shares held in their names without 
shareholder instructions on board elections, “executive compensation, or any other 
significant matter.”322 
These amendments are meant to protect shareholders by preventing unin-
structed broker voting and voting distortions. This is especially significant in the 
context of majority voting—“broker votes can no longer be relied on” for this pur-
pose, thus “increasing the insurgent’s chances to unseat an incumbent in a ‘with-
hold the vote’ campaign.”323 It also leads, however, to potential unintended nega-
tive consequences. For example, the inability of brokers to vote uninstructed 
shares means that corporations with high supermajority requirements for amending  
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their charters may be unable to reach these thresholds without uninstructed broker 
vote, even with strong support from shareholders and directors.324 This phenome-
non is referred to as a “frozen charter.”325 
e. Proxy Access 
The advocates of increasing shareholder power have persistently demanded im-
plementation of the “proxy access” rule. The idea is fairly straightforward—under 
the rule, “significant long-term shareholders should have the right to place [their] 
board candidates on the company’s own proxy statement.”326 Proponents argue that 
proxy access empowers shareholders to actively monitor managers and the incum-
bent board “by the threat of replacement.”327 The Dodd-Frank Act provided the 
SEC with the express authority to regulate shareholders’ access to the corporate 
proxy.328 
In turn, the SEC adopted Rule 14a-11, the proxy access rule, in 2010, but the 
D.C. Circuit struck it down in 2011, holding that the SEC failed to “adequately . . 
. assess the economic effects of [the] new rule.”329 Rule 14a-11 required public 
companies to include in their proxy materials nominations for director from quali-
fied shareholders who own at least 3% of a company’s outstanding shares for a 
minimum of three years.330 Yet, “[i]n 2015, at least 116 companies received a 
shareholder proposal seeking a proxy access bylaw along the parameters of the va-
cated SEC rule.”331 Companies’ responses varied from rejecting the idea on prin-
ciple, to expressing openness to adopting or agreeing to adopt the rule, sometimes 
requiring a 5% ownership threshold instead of 3%.332 As a result, “125 companies 
had a proxy access bylaw by the end of 2015”; it is likely that a majority of S&P 
500 companies will follow the trend in the near future.333 Recent practice indicates 
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that the “3%/3-year ownership thresholds have become the unofficial standards” 
of proxy access provisions.334 
Proponents’ arguments in favor of proxy access may be summarized as follows: 
it “promotes greater director accountability to shareholders”; it makes it 
significantly easier and less costly to nominate board candidates; it fosters 
competition leading to election of “better qualified and more independent” 
directors; and it “makes it easier . . . for boards to replace underperforming 
directors.”335 There is, however, disagreement among advocates for proxy access 
regarding the proper way to implement the rule. On one hand, the regime, denoted 
as “private ordering,” allows shareholders to initiate adoption of proxy access.336 
On the other hand, a “default” regime, imposes the proxy access rule. Professor 
Bebchuk argues that because of the difference in power between management and 
shareholders, private ordering will fail to increase shareholder involvement in 
director nominations.337 Thus, Bebchuk favors the default rule with the minimum 
threshold requirements,338 as vacated Rule 14a-11 provided. Professor Grundfest, 
however, advocates for a private ordering regime because it allows shareholders to 
choose among different structures of the rule, finding the best fit for a company’s 
needs.339  
In response to the financial crisis, Delaware enacted section 112 of the DGCL. 
It states: 
bylaws may provide that if the corporation solicits proxies with respect 
to an election of directors, it may be required . . . to include in its proxy 
solicitation materials (including any form of proxy it distributes), in 
addition to individuals nominated by the board of directors, 1 or more 
individuals nominated by a stockholder.340  
Thus, section 112 provides for private ordering of proxy access, in line with 
Grundfest’s proposal. In addition, the SEC did not appeal the D.C. Circuit case, 
and instead amended Rule 14a-8 on September 14, 2011, to prohibit companies 
from excluding shareholder proposals that would amend a company’s governing 
documents regarding director nomination procedures.341 It resulted in what 
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Bernard Sharfman referred to as “shareholder-initiated proxy access” in addition 
to “board-initiated proxy access.”342 
Companies have started using “substantially implemented” or “directly 
conflicts” exemptions to exclude shareholder proxy access proposals.343 Yet, con-
sistent with the 2016 season, in 2017, the SEC continued to affirm that shareholder 
proposals asking for a proxy access rule “are considered to be substantially imple-
mented if companies provide terms permitting shareholders that own 3% or more 
for at least three years to nominate the greater of two directors, or 20%, of the 
board.”344 In addition, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance stated that “the 
staff won’t view a shareholder proposal to be directly conflicting with a manage-
ment proposal if a reasonable shareholder could logically vote for both.”345 It elim-
inated a major way companies addressed proxy access proposals.346  
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
This Part presents our hypotheses, data, methodology, and empirical evidence 
regarding the role of outside shareholders in preventing stock option manipulation. 
Our evidence shows that the presence of outside directors did not reduce either 
corporate fraud or malfeasance by the board during our sample period extending 
from 1996 to 2015. 
A. Securities Class Action Lawsuits 
We start by examining the number of securities class action lawsuits that were 
either settled, dismissed, or are ongoing. We obtain this data from the Stanford 
Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC). A securities class action contains allegations 
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1996 63 20 33 0 96 
1997 121 40 44 0 165 
1998 151 52 81 0 232 
1999 120 43 83 0 203 
2000 133 57 72 0 205 
2001 419 51 68 0 487 
2002 164 78 93 1 258 
2003 117 47 100 1 218 
2004 121 44 106 0 227 
2005 91 34 86 1 178 
2006 69 34 46 1 116 
2007 92 45 72 5 169 
2008 90 50 105 5 200 
2009 57 35 77 12 146 
2010 53 16 89 14 156 
2011 57 16 110 21 188 
2012 34 11 72 45 151 
2013 13 4 47 106 166 
2014 5 0 22 143 170 
2015 189 0 12 131 332 
Totals 2,159 677 1,418 486 4,063 
Table 1: Security Class Action Lawsuits from SLCA 
 
SCAC has kept track of about 4000 class action lawsuits since the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was passed. The total number of cases filed, 
settled, dismissed, or ongoing is shown in Table 1. The total number of lawsuits filed 
is 1407 for the 1996–2000 time period, while the number of cases settled is 588 or 
64.1% of the total. The number of cases settled for $10 million or more equals 212 
or 23.1% of the total. 
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Looking at the post-SOX period between 2002 and 2008,347 we see that the total 
number of lawsuits decided is 1116, and the number of cases settled is 580 or 52.0% 
of the total cases decided. The number of cases settled for $10 million or more equals 
254 or 22.8% of the total cases decided, which is very similar to the pre-SOX period. 
The dollar volume of settlements shows similar patterns. All settlements average 
$3.6 billion per year pre-SOX and $3.3 billion post-SOX period. For large settle-
ments (more than $10 million), the corresponding figures are $3.3 billion per year 
in the pre-SOX period and $3.1 billion in the post-SOX period. Hence, there is no 
sign of abatement in the number or dollar amount of settled cases during the post-
SOX period. Consequently, SOX does not appear to be leading to better corporate 
governance. 
B. Malfeasance of the Board 
Next, we investigate whether malfeasance by the board has declined following 
SOX.348 To explore this issue, we revisit the options backdating scandal of 2006 
and extend our time period to 2015. We explore whether executives manipulate the 
timing of option grants or timing of information flows to benefit themselves during 
the post-SOX period. If executives have positive information around their option 
grants, they can delay the public announcement of news until after executive 
options are granted in order to benefit their compensation. This activity is called 
spring-loading. If executives possess negative information around their option 
grant time, they can expedite the release of negative information to a date earlier 
than information release in order to benefit their compensation. The early release 
of negative information reduces the stock price and thus the exercise price of the 
options. This activity is called bullet-dodging.  
The dating hypothesis is linked to backdating and forward-dating of stock 
options. Backdating suggests that executives change the date of options grants to 
an earlier date when stock price was at a minimum. It is straightforward to test this 
hypothesis, because if there is a change in the grant date, grant date will be reported 
with delays. There is a positive relationship between the length of delays and the 
amount of stock price bounce since the grant date. Forward-dating suggests that if 
the stock price has been falling since the grant date, executives may have incentives 
to wait to see if the price will fall further. Forward-dating is more difficult to test 
because there is always a bounce in price between the grant date and the reporting 
date. Nevertheless, the forward-dating hypothesis also predicts a stock price 
decline prior to an option grant date. 
To test these hypotheses, we obtain option grant data from the Thompson 
Reuters insider reporting database, which contains all option grants to executives 
and directors including inside and outside directors for all publicly listed firms in 
the United States. Other studies have also used the insider trading database to 
                                                                                                             
 
 347. We restrict our post-SOX time period to 2003–2008 to abstract from the large number 
of ongoing cases during the post-SOX period.  
 348. See M. P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Dating Game: Do Managers 
Designate Option Grant Dates To Increase Their Compensation?, 21 REV. FİN. STUD. 1907 
(2008); see also S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Ending Executive 
Manipulations of Incentive Compensation, 42 J. CORP. L. 277 (2016). 
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analyze corporate governance and internal control mechanisms.349 The database 
contains identifying information of firms, identifying information of executives, 
the number of shares granted, the underlying security of the option, the grant date, 
and the reporting date. Since the Thompson Reuters database starts at 1996, we 
limit our analysis period from January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2015. We collect 
daily returns of the underlying company stocks and the value weighted market 
index from CRSP.  
We analyze three subperiods that represent different eras in executive 
compensation literature. The first subperiod is the pre-SOX period, between 
January 1, 1996, and August 31, 2002. There is no regulation about stock option 
backdating in this period. The second period, scandal-period, is between 
September 1, 2002, and December 31, 2006. The feature of this period is the high 
number of backdating scandals. The last period is January 1, 2007, to December 
31, 2015, which is named as the post-scandal period.350 
 Table 2 shows the number of grants, the number of firms, and the number of 
options granted for top executives as well as inside and outside directors. We report 
these numbers separately for promptly reporting and delayed reporting for each 
group. Total number of options granted for inside directors and top executives is 
40,914.5 million, and for outside directors is 8460.4 million for the whole sample 
period. Of these totals, 21,697.3 million options were granted in the pre-SOX 
period; 9713.5 million options were granted in the backdating scandals period; and 
17,964.10 million options were granted in the post-scandal period. Also, 29,885.8 
million options were reported promptly, while 19,489.10 million options were re-
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Reporting 103,639 4,976 3,612.80 36,816 3,765 1,358.20 
Delayed 





Reporting 460,543 4,812 6,722.60 128,130 4,096 1,373.20 
Delayed 






Reporting 746,567 4,917 14,401.00 172,716 3,359 2,418.00 
Delayed 
Reporting 26,902 1,576 979.90 10,371 905 165.20 
Table 2: Sample Characteristics of Insider Trading by Periods 
 
In the pre-SOX period, the delayed reporting number of grants, number of firms, 
and number of options are much higher than those for promptly reporting option 
grants. Only one-fifth of top executives and inside directors report their options 
promptly, while this ratio is one-third for outside directors. This relationship reverses 
after SOX. The number of promptly reported grants, firms, and options inflates while 
number of delayed grants, firms, and options mitigates in post-SOX period. Prompt 
reporting increased up to 90% of all option grants for both insiders and outsiders. 
This trend continues in the post-scandal period. Nevertheless, even in the post-scan-
dal period, about 3% of all option grants are late reported. 
We use event methodology to measure the abnormal returns around event dates. 
Event dates are option grant dates. We measure ninety days of cumulative market-
adjusted abnormal daily stock returns (CAR) before the event date and ninety days 
of CAR after the event date. For all summary statistics, the unit of observation is the 
individual grant. 
We define abnormal returns as the difference between the daily returns for firms 
with the option awards to executives and the value weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, 
Nasdaq, and ARCA. This approach controls for market movements and implicitly 
assumes the average beta or risk-exposure is one. Our sample contains more than 
6000 firms; therefore, we can safely claim that this assumption is satisfied. Abnormal 
return ARit for stock i and day t is computed by a market adjusted model as:  
ARit = (Rit – Rmt) 
For each firm i and day t, where Rit is the simple daily return on the stock option-
granting firm i on day t. Rmt is the daily return on the value weighted index of the 
stock market. For each event date t, these returns are first averaged across all option 
granting firms i to compute average abnormal returns:  
AARt = !	#$ ∑ 𝐴𝑅()	#$(*!  
The average abnormal returns are cumulated across the event dates as follows: 
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CART = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅)+)*!  
These cumulative abnormal returns are then graphed to examine the behavior of 
abnormal returns around option granting dates. In Figures 1 through 6, abnormal re-
turns are computed using a market adjusted model. Day 0 refers to the grant day. Day 
90 refers to the ninetieth trading day after the grant date, while day -90 refers to the 
ninetieth trading day before the grant date.  
We group insiders into two groups: Executives and inside directors; and outside 
directors. Inside directors are those who combine the title of director with the title of 
officer. An example is OD (officer-director). The title of outside directors is simply 
given as D.351 To highlight the emphasis by SOX, on outside directors, we combine 
executives and inside-directors in one group called executives and contrast this group 
with nonexecutive outside directors. 
Figure 1 shows the mean CARs from ninety trading days prior to the grant date 
(date 0) to ninety days after the grant date for executives and inside directors (insid-
ers) versus outside directors during the pre-SOX period (January 1996–August 
2002). As can be seen from Figure 1, stock prices form a V-pattern for all insiders’ 
option grants, either reported promptly or late. The presence of the V-pattern indi-
cates that option timing games were prevalent during the pre-SOX period.  
Furthermore, Figure 1 indicates that the late reported options have higher post-
grant returns than promptly reported options. This pattern holds for both executives 
and outside directors. This finding indicates that backdating was also prevalent prior 
to SOX.  
Finally, Figure 1 shows that the post-grant returns are much smaller for outside 
directors than for insiders. This pattern holds true to both prompt and late reported 
option grants. This finding indicates that outside directors are involved with manip-
ulative compensation games to a lesser extent than the executives during the pre-
SOX period. 
The specific numbers are as follows: Executives enjoy a post-grant bounce of 
7.8% and 9.2% abnormal returns following the grant date for promptly-reported and 
late-reported option grants, respectively. The difference between these two groups, 
or 1.4%, can be attributed to option-timing games, while 7.8% can be attributed to 
information-timing games. 
The comparable figures for the outside directors are as follows: Outside directors 
enjoy a post-grant bounce of 3.7% and 7.0% abnormal returns following the grant 
date for promptly reported and late-reported option grants, respectively. The differ-
ence between these two groups, or 3.3% can be attributed to option-timing games, 
                                                                                                             
 
 351. The remaining titles include the chairman of the board (CB), vice chairman (VC), 
assistant vice president (AV), chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), 
chief investment officer (CI), chief operating officer (CO), chief technology officer (CT), ex-
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president (P), senior vice president (SVP), vice president (VP), secretary (S), controller (C), 
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such as members of the advisory committee (AC), members of the compensation committee 
(CC), members of the executive committee (EC), and members of the finance committee (FC). 
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while 3.7% can be attributed to information-timing games. Overall, this evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that outside directors were involved in compensation 
manipulation games albeit to a slightly lesser degree than executives. Furthermore, 
more of the compensation games involved manipulating information flows rather 
than blatant backdating of option grant dates. 
 
Figure 1:  Abnormal returns around option grant days, pre-SOX, by title and 
reporting delays 
 
Figure 2 shows the abnormal profits of insiders and outside directors during the 
post-SOX, option-dating scandal period of September 2002 to December 2006. We 
notice that the post-grant stock price bounce is much higher here for all groups: 
Executives enjoy a post-grant bounce of 4.6% and 14.9% abnormal returns following 
the grant date for promptly-reported and late-reported option grants, respectively. 
The difference between these two groups, or 10.3%, can be attributed to option-tim-
ing games, while 4.6% can be attributed to information-timing games. Thus, option-
timing games appear to be much more prevalent during this time period. 
The comparable figures for outside directors are as follows: Outside directors en-
joy a post-grant bounce of 4.6% and 10.3% abnormal returns following the grant date 
for promptly-reported and late-reported option grants, respectively. The difference 
between these two groups, or 5.7%, can be attributed to option-timing games, while 
4.6% can be attributed to information-timing games. Overall, this evidence is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that outside directors were involved albeit to a slightly 
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Figure 2:  Abnormal returns around option grant days, 2002-2006, by title 
and reporting delays 
 
This evidence flies in the face of the intended purpose of SOX, which relied on 
outside directors to serve as a check on top management. Outside directors clearly 
do not appear to fulfill this purpose. Instead of acting as a check on the top manage-
ment, outside directors appear to benefit from both information flow as well as option 
grant timing games almost as much as the top executives.  
We now turn to the post-scandal period of 2007 to 2015. Figure 3 shows the ab-
normal profits of insiders and outside directors during the post-scandal period.352 
Figure 3 shows that compensation games continue during the most recent, post-scan-
dal period. Executives still enjoy a post-grant bounce of 3.8% and 4.1% abnormal 
returns following the grant date for promptly reported and late-reported option 
grants, respectively. The difference between these two groups, or 0.3%, can be at-
tributed to option-timing games, while 3.8% can be attributed to information-timing 
games. Thus, once again, information-timing games appear to be much more preva-
lent during this time period. 
The comparable figures for the outside directors are as follows: Outside directors 
enjoy a post-grant bounce of 3.8% and 7.5% abnormal returns following the grant 
date for promptly-reported and late-reported option grants, respectively. The differ-
ence between these two groups, or 3.7%, can be attributed to option-timing games, 
while 3.8% can be attributed to information-timing games. Overall, this evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that outside directors were involved as much, if not 
more, than the executives in compensation manipulation games.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
 352. We call this period the post-scandal period because the scandals were revealed in 
2006. 
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Figure 3:  Abnormal returns around option grant days, 2007-2015, by title 
and reporting delays 
 
Once again, the significant post-grant returns that are captured by the outside di-
rectors indicate that SOX has not worked as intended. Outside directors are not 
providing sufficient checks and balances on top management to prevent option tim-
ing games even in the post-scandal period. To investigate the extent of these games, 
we now restrict our attention to very large option grants involving more than 100,000 
shares. The evidence for large grants is shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6.  
 
Figure 4:  Abnormal returns around option grant days, pre-SOX, large 
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Figure 5:  Abnormal returns around option grant days, 2002-2006, large 




Figure 6:  Abnormal returns around option grant days, 2007-2015, large 
grants, by title and reporting delays 
 
 
Our evidence for the large grants shows similar but higher abnormal returns. The 
fact that the post-grant date abnormal returns increase even more for larger grants 
further corroborates the conclusion that these stock return patterns are not random, 
but rather they are deliberate and planned. Overall, our evidence does not support 
relying on outside directors to provide an effective check on top management either 
before or after SOX.  
804 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:757 
 
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Our evidence shows that SOX has not been effective in improving corporate gov-
ernance. It has not reduced the overall fraudulent activity. The number of class action 
lawsuits has not decreased significantly since SOX was passed. Furthermore, the 
large volume of large settlements has not declined. Our evidence also shows that 
SOX has not reduced manipulative activity by the board. Overall, our evidence 
indicates that the responsibilities placed by SOX on outside directors do not appear 
to work as intended. 
Our recommendation is placing more emphasis and power on the shareholders. 
Instead of placing almost exclusive emphasis on the board of directors as a check on 
top management, we need to strengthen corporate governance by strengthening the 
monitoring role of the shareholders. While not all shareholders will be interested in 
providing a monitoring role, all shareholders will certainly benefit from enhanced 
shareholder rights.  
We suggest a number of reforms that can enhance shareholder rights. First, the 
recent trend towards multiclass control structures with unequal voting rights should 
be checked. Some recent IPOs have involved giving zero shares to outside share-
holders. Firms that have recently adopted multiclass shareholder structure with une-
qual voting rights include Berkshire Hathaway, Google, LinkedIn, Zynga, Groupon, 
and Facebook. There is also evidence that shareholder returns suffer in controlled 
firms.353  
Second, shareholder voting rights can be strengthened by making shareholder by-
law resolutions binding on the board of directors. Currently, the SEC requires that 
public companies include shareholder proposals on their proxy statements.354 
However, these proposals are nonbinding recommendations to the board of directors. 
Furthermore, corporations typically exclude these proposals under any one of twelve 
common reasons, such as “improper under state law.”355 Even if passed by the share-
holders, these resolutions may not be adopted by the board of directors for any num-
ber of reasons. Binding bylaw resolutions would give direct control to the sharehold-
ers to assert their interests over the board of directors and top management. 
Another important recommendation is a majority-vote requirement for the elec-
tion of the board, instead of the current plurality rule. The current rule does not permit 
shareholders to vote against a nominee. They can only withhold their vote if they are 
unhappy with the candidate. Theoretically, if there is no competing nominee, a per-
son can be elected to the board with a single vote. Majority voting can be further 
strengthened by requiring that if any director does not receive a majority of the votes, 
the director must resign immediately and a new vote must be held to determine the 
replacement director. Having an effective majority requirement would increase 
shareholder power over the election of the board.  
                                                                                                             
 
 353.  See EDWARD KAMONJOH, IRRC INSTITUTE, CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE 
STANDARD & POOR’S 1500: A FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE & RISK (2016), 
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 354. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2017). 
 355. Id.; see Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder 
Proposals, 66 J. FIN. 1579, 1579 n.1 (2011).  
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Finally, we suggest a revamping of the Direct Registration System to decrease 
costs and barriers to shareholders exercising their voting right. Specifically, the sys-
tem should not only allow for shareholders to automatically register and unregister 
their shares to the corporation’s books through a secure online portal, but also edu-
cate themselves on corporate issues and vote their shares through this portal instead 
of using the archaic means currently employed. 
CONCLUSION 
In this study we examine the monitoring role of outside directors. SOX has placed 
special emphasis on independent board members to control and monitor top manage-
ment. Our evidence presented in this Article shows that outside directors are not ful-
filling this requirement as SOX intended.  
First, we investigate the number of class action lawsuits and the dollar value of 
settlements from 1996 to 2015. We find no sign of abatement in either the number 
of settled cases or the dollar amount of settlements during the post-SOX period as 
compared to the pre-SOX period. Consequently, the provisions of SOX do not appear 
to be leading to better corporate governance—by reducing lawsuits against corpora-
tions. 
Second, we examine direct malfeasance by the board. In this regard, we 
investigate the timing and backdating of executive compensation options between 
1996 and 2015. In this study, we find that outside directors manipulated their option 
grants like top executives do. Similar to options given to top management, outside 
directors use dating and timing techniques to manipulate stock options granted. Our 
evidence shows that they employ backdating, spring-loading and bullet-dodging 
games to increase the value of their options. Backdating, among other techniques, 
provides remarkable profits to outside directors. Application of these techniques for 
late-reported grants increase outside directors’ compensation by substantial amounts. 
Specifically, management received extra compensation amounts of 9.2%, 14.9%, and 
4.1% for the 1996–2002 period, the 2003–2006 period, and the 2007–2014 period, 
respectively. For outside directors, the comparable numbers are 7.0%, 10.3%, and 
7.5%, respectively. For large late-reported option grants, abnormal returns increase 
even further. 
Our evidence strongly suggests that outside directors are not fulfilling the moni-
toring responsibility placed on them by SOX. We recommend that the solution lies 
not in strengthening the board of directors, but in strengthening the power of the 
shareholders. We make four specific recommendations: First, we recommend that 
multiclass voting structures should be eliminated. Multiclass voting structures exac-
erbate the conflict between shareholders and management and lead to inferior out-
comes. Our second recommendation is to make shareholder resolutions binding on 
the board of directors. Currently, management typically ignores nonbinding share-
holder resolutions. We also recommend that plurality voting be eliminated and re-
placed by majority voting for the board of directors. Majority voting shifts the rela-
tive power to elect directors away from management to the shareholders. Finally, we 
propose the Direct Registration System currently employed be replaced with a more 
modern system, allowing for both registration and voting. 
